%0 Journal Article
%T Auctioning the Right to Play Ultimatum Games and the Impact on Equilibrium Selection
%A Jason Shachat
%A J. Todd Swarthout
%J Games
%D 2013
%I MDPI AG
%R 10.3390/g4040738
%X We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original treatment. With endogenous selection via auctions, we find that play converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium, and auction prices emerge supporting this equilibrium by the principle of forward induction. With random assignment, we find play also converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium as predicted by the principle of loss avoidance. While Nash equilibria with low offers are observed, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium never is.
%K ultimatum bargaining
%K auction
%K forward induction
%K loss avoidance
%U http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/4/4/738