%0 Journal Article
%T A autonomia burocr¨¢tica das organiza  es financeiras internacionais: um estudo comparado entre o Banco Mundial e o Fundo Monet¨¢rio Internacional The bureaucratic autonomy of international financial organizations: a comparative study between the World Bank and International Monetary Fund
%A Feliciano de S¨¢ Guimar£¿es
%J Contexto Internacional
%D 2012
%I Pontif¨ªcia Universidade Cat¨®lica do Rio de Janeiro
%R 10.1590/s0102-85292012000100008
%X O objetivo deste artigo ¨¦ compreender as raz es da maior autonomia burocr¨¢tica do Banco Mundial em rela  o ao Fundo Monet¨¢rio Internacional. Acreditamos que as raz es desta diferen a residem na burocracia com expertise mais diversificada do Banco Mundial em contraste com a burocracia de expertise mais r¨ªgida do FMI. Uma burocracia mais diversificada aumenta as possibilidades de forma  o de coaliz es com ONGs em torno de policies de interesses comuns. Essas coaliz es aumentam os custos de interven  o dos Estados para alterar ou barrar as policies defendidas pelo corpo burocr¨¢tico. Assim, quanto maior a diversidade de expertise da burocracia internacional, maior ser¨¢ a possibilidade de forma  o de coaliz es com ONGs em torno de policies de seu interesse e, consequentemente, maior ser¨¢ sua autonomia burocr¨¢tica. Do ponto de vista te¨®rico, utilizamos a teoria agente-principal para discutir burocracias internacionais. Usamos o m¨¦todo comparativo com base em instrumentos qualitativos de an¨¢lise e estat¨ªstica descritiva. The main goal of this article is to understand why the World Bank has reached more bureaucratic autonomy than the International Monetary Fund regardless the fact that both have similar institutional structures. We believe that the reason for such difference is a more diverse expertise of the World Bank compared to the IMF. We claim that a more diverse bureaucracy increases the likelihood of coalition formation with NGOs. Such coalitions aim to support policies that are important for both the bureaucracy and the NGO's. Consequently, they increase the costs for both State intervention and State control over the organization. The higher costs of intervention and control allow bureaucrats to act more freely according to their interests. Hence, our hypothesis is the following: the more diverse the bureaucratic expertise, the more likely is the formation of coalitions between bureaucracy and NGOs, and the greater the costs for State control and intervention. Higher intervention and control costs, in turn, increase bureaucratic autonomy. We use mainly qualitative research methods with some descriptive statistics.
%K Organiza  es Internacionais
%K Autonomia Burocr¨¢tica
%K Banco Mundial
%K Fundo Monet¨¢rio Internacional (FMI)
%K International Organization
%K Bureaucratic Autonomy
%K World Bank
%K International Monetary Fund (IMF)
%U http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292012000100008