%0 Journal Article
%T L¡¯externalisation de la fonction comptable ¨¤ l¡¯¨¦preuve de la th¨¦orie du signal
%A Guillaume Chanson
%A V¨¦ronique Rouges
%J Finance Contr£¿le Strat¨¦gie
%D 2012
%I Association FCS
%X Malgr¨¦ les dispositifs l¨¦gaux, il demeure une asym¨¦trie d¡¯information quant ¨¤ la qualit¨¦ des ¨¦tats financiers obligatoires. L¡¯externalisation de la fonction comptable peut jouer un r le de signal, en limitant les possibilit¨¦s de gestion des donn¨¦es comptables. Nous construisons un cadre th¨¦orique s¡¯appuyant sur la th¨¦orie du signal afin d¡¯expliquer l¡¯externalisation de la fonction comptable. Nous le testons sur un ¨¦chantillon de 123 entreprises. Trois hypoth¨¨ses sont corrobor¨¦es : les entreprises cot¨¦es et fortement endett¨¦es r¨¦alisent plus souvent leur comptabilit¨¦ en externe ¨¤ l¡¯inverse des entreprises ayant recours au co-commissariat. Despite legal constraints, there is an information asymmetry concerning the quality of financial statements. The outsourcing of accounting services may work as a signal, in as far as it sets a limit on earnings management.We build a theoretical framework based on the signaling theory to explain the outsourcing of accounting services. We test the theoretical frame on a sample of 123 French companies. Three hypotheses are corroborated: listed and highly indebted companies use external accounting services more frequently; companies with two external auditors do not.
%K signaling theory ¨C outsourcing ¨C accounting services ¨C earnings management.
%K M1 - Business Administration
%K M4 - Accounting and Auditing
%K th¨¦orie du signal ¨C externalisation ¨C comptabilit¨¦ ¨C gestion des donn¨¦es comptables.
%U http://fcs.revues.org/1189