%0 Journal Article
%T R¨¦glementation du travail et structure financi¨¨re : Th¨¦orie et preuve empirique Employment laws and capital structure:Theory and empirical evidence
%A Pramuan Bunkanwanicha
%A Christophe Moussu
%J Finance Contr£¿le Strat¨¦gie
%D 2012
%I Association FCS
%X Cet article r¨¦v¨¨le une association n¨¦gative forte entre la r¨¦glementation du travail et l¡¯endettement financier des entreprises, sur un large ¨¦chantillon d¡¯entreprises cot¨¦es des 21 pays les plus riches de l¡¯OCDE. L¡¯hypoth¨¨se d¨¦velopp¨¦e est que la r¨¦glementation du travail a une incidence sur la rigidit¨¦ de l¡¯emploi et donc sur la structure de charges des entreprises. Cette rigidit¨¦ se traduit par un levier op¨¦rationnel plus important, qui induit les entreprises ¨¤ abaisser leur niveau d¡¯endettement. Les r¨¦sultats sont robustes ¨¤ l¡¯introduction de variables institutionnelles pr¨¦c¨¦demment utilis¨¦es dans la litt¨¦rature, notamment les lois prot¨¦geant les syndicats, les actionnaires minoritaires et les cr¨¦anciers. This article reveals the existence of a strong negative relationship between employment laws and the financial leverage of firms. Our study uses a large sample of listed firms from the 21 high-income OECD countries. Our hypothesis is that employment laws have an impact on labor-market rigidity and therefore the cost structure of firms. This increased rigidity translates into higher operational leverage for firms, enticing them to decrease their financial leverage. Results are robust to the introduction of several institutional variables used in the literature, in particular the laws protecting unions, minority shareholders and creditors.
%K capital structure
%K employment laws
%K labor unions
%K structure financi¨¨re
%K r¨¦glementation du travail
%K syndicat
%U http://fcs.revues.org/87