%0 Journal Article
%T Phenomenological Skillful Coping: Another Counter-Argument to Daniel Dennett¡¯s
%A Jethro Mas¨ªs
%J Journal of Philosophy of Life
%D 2012
%I Research Institute for Contemporary Philosophy of Life
%X This paper deals with Daniel Dennett¡¯s well-known charges against phenomenological philosophy as an endevour to restore the rights of introspection: that is, the attempt, albeit doomed to failure, to contribute to the science of the mind from a purported incorrigible, ineffable and ¡®subjective¡¯ (interpreted as ¡®private¡¯) first-person perspective. According to Dennett¡¯s heterophenomenology, only a strict third-person method is possible when it comes to the scientific study of the mind. I will dispute Dennett¡¯s method in order to do both: correct Dennett¡¯s caricaturization of phenomenological philosophy as na ve introspection and offer not only a clarification of phenomenology¡¯s true aims and scope, but also a case in which phenomenology will stand as a crucial option in the new studies of the mind, under the sigh of fresh air that can be found in the new approaches to cognitive science (the so-called 4EA approaches: embodied, embedded, extended, enacted, affective). By way of introducing the concept of ¡®phenomenological skillful-coping,¡¯ an affirmative respond to Dennett¡¯s own question shall be given: ¡°Is there anything about experience that is not explorable by heterophenomenology? I¡¯d like to know what.¡± The answer to Dennett should be firm: Yes there is! No less than the most basic non-theoretical, non-representational, embodied and embedded, human experience or coping.
%U http://www.philosophyoflife.org/jpl201205.pdf