%0 Journal Article
%T Incumbents without a Campaign Finance Advantage: Competition and Money in Chile＊s Congressional Elections Sin una ventaja financiera: Incumbentes y el gasto electoral en las elecciones parlamentarias de Chile
%A Joel W. Johnson
%J Journal of Politics in Latin America
%D 2011
%I German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)
%X Research from various countries has shown that incumbents in legislative elections raise and spend more money when they face a tougher contest. A statistical analysis of Chilean candidates＊ campaign finance disclosures shows the opposite: an inverse relationship between incumbent spending and electoral competitiveness. This occurs because Chile＊s deputies are relatively limited in their influence over policy and pork and because the congressional electoral system makes most competitive contests relevant only to the intra-coalitional balance of power. This account implies that political finance is as much a function of political systems and the supply of contributions as it is candidates＊ demand for funds, and motivates several hypotheses about campaign finance in Chile. Among others, the analysis confirms that incumbents and challengers compete on a level playing field, spending similar amounts of campaign finance. The paper also illustrates that incumbents and challengers fare equally well in Chile＊s ※secret§ donation system. Estudios en varios pa赤ses han demostrado que los incumbentes en las elecciones legislativas recaudan y gastan m芍s dinero cuando se enfrentan a una competencia m芍s dura. No obstante, el an芍lisis estad赤stico del financiamiento electoral de candidatos chilenos demuestra lo contrario: una relaci車n inversa entre los gastos de los incumbentes y la competitividad electoral. Esto ocurre porque los diputados son relativamente limitados en su influencia sobre pol赤ticas p迆blicas e incluso en la dispensa de favores canalizados (pork-barrel) y porque el sistema binominal hace que la competencia suceda principalmente al interior de coaliciones. La implicaci車n l車gica es que el financiamiento pol赤tico es tanto una funci車n del sistema pol赤tico y de la oferta de contribuciones de campa a, como de la demanda de los candidatos por esos fondos, hecho que motiva la presentaci車n de varias hip車tesis sobre la financiaci車n de campa as en Chile. Entre otros resultados, el an芍lisis confirma que los incumbentes y sus retadores compiten en ※cancha neutra§, es decir, gastando cantidades similares en campa a. Tambi谷n muestra que a ambos 每 a incumbentes y a sus competidores 每 les va igualmente bien con los aportes reservados.
%K Political science
%K campaigns and elections
%K campaign finance
%K Chile
%K congressional elections
%K incumbents
%K campaign finance
%K secret donations
%K 320
%K 322
%K 324
%K Chile
%K 2005-2010
%K ciencias pol赤ticas
%K elecciones parliamentarias
%K Chile
%K elecciones parliamentarias
%K incumbencia
%K financiamiento de campa as
%K aportes reservados
%K Chile
%K 2005-2010
%U http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/468