%0 Journal Article
%T The Argument for Anomalous Monism, Again
%A Deren Olgun
%J Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy
%D 2011
%I Erasmus University, Rotterdam
%X t is frequently argued that Donald Davidson¡¯s anomalous monism implies property epiphenomenalism: that it renders the mental properties of events irrelevant to causal relations, so that rather than being a solution to the problem of how mental events cause physical ones, it actually denies that they do. Whilst this may be an appropriate criticism of the non-reductive physicalist theses that anomalous monism has inspired, I argue that it is an inappropriate criticism of Davidson¡¯s position. Specifically, the extensional character of causation and the ontology on which the argument for anomalous monism is based preclude the possibility of levelling this kind of criticism at Davidson. I argue that such criticisms are made only by forcing onto anomalous monism an ontology that it actively seeks to deny; it is only by appreciating Davidson¡¯s approach to metaphysics and causation in general that we can understand why the claim that anomalous monism implies property epiphenomenalism is so misguided.
%U http://www.eur.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/fw/ESJP/ESJP.1.2011.03.Olgun.pdf