%0 Journal Article
%T Broad¡¯s Accounts of Temporal Experience
%A Oliver William Rashbrook
%J Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy
%D 2012
%I McMaster University
%R 10.4148/jhap.v1i5.1306
%X Two extremely detailed accounts of temporal experience can be found in the work of C. D. Broad. These accounts have been subject to considerable criticism. I argue that, when we look more carefully at Broad¡¯s work, we find that much of this criticism fails to find its target. I show that the objection that ultimately proves troubling for Broad stems from his commitment to two principles: i) the Thin-PSA, and ii) the ¡®Overlap¡¯ claim. I use this result to demonstrate that we can learn two extremely important lessons from Broad¡¯s work on temporal experience. The first lesson is that there is a structural problem facing any account that commits to these two principles. This is significant given that a number of recent accounts of temporal experience are so committed. The second lesson is that the problem facing these accounts stems only from commitment to the Thin-PSA and ¡®Overlap¡¯, rather than to commitment to a particular conception of how experiences are to be individuated. This, I argue, gives us reason to reject Tye¡¯s recent claim that the problems facing accounts of temporal experience can be dissolved simply by making stipulations about how experiences are to be individuated.
%U http://dx.doi.org/10.4148/jhap.v1i5.1306