%0 Journal Article
%T Stackelberg Assumption vs. Nash Assumption in Partially Cooperative Games
%A Lina Mallozzi
%A Stef Tijs
%J AUCO Czech Economic Review
%D 2012
%I Charles University in Prague
%X We deal with n-person normal form games where a subset of players decide to cooperate (signatories) and choose strategies by maximizing the aggregate welfare of the coalition members as in International Environmental Agreements (IEA) context. The non-cooperating (non-signatories) players choose their strategies as a Nash equilibrium. In this paper the partial cooperative equilibrium (PCE) under the Nash-Cournot and the Stackelberg assumptions are considered and presented also in the case of non-signatories multiple decision. Some properties are discussed in both situations, particularly the profit of the players are compared.
%K Partial cooperation
%K Stackelberg assumption
%K Nash-Cournot assumption
%K Stackelberg leader¡¯s value
%U http://auco.cuni.cz/mag/article/download/id/121/type/attachment