%0 Journal Article
%T Voting Experiments: Measuring Vulnerability of Voting Procedures to Manipulation
%A Jan Palguta
%J AUCO Czech Economic Review
%D 2011
%I Charles University in Prague
%X A minimal reduction in strategic voter¡¯s knowledge about other voters¡¯ voting patterns severely limits her ability to strategically manipulate the voting outcome. In this paper I relax the implicit assumption made in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite¡¯s impossibility theorem about strategic voter¡®s complete information about all other voters¡¯ preference profiles. Via a series of computation-based simulations I find that vulnerability to strategic voting is decreasing in the number of voters and increasing in the number of alternatives. Least vulnerable voting procedures are Condorcet-consistent procedures, followed by elimination procedures, while most prone to manipulation are the simplest rules. Strategic voting is vulnerable both to an absolute and relative reduction in amount of information.
%K Voting
%K manipulation
%K information
%K computation-based simulations
%U http://auco.cuni.cz/mag/article/download/id/119/type/attachment