%0 Journal Article
%T Neutrality as a Twofold Concept
%A Alexa Zellentin
%J Les Ateliers de l¡¯¨¦thique
%D 2009
%I Universit¨¦ de Montr¨¦al
%X 159 Under the circumstances of pluralism people often claim that the state ought to be neutral towards its citizens¡¯ conceptions of the good life. However, what it means for the state to be neutral is often unclear. This is partly because there are different conceptions of neutrality and partly because what neutrality entails depends largely on the context in which neutrality is demanded. This paper discusses three different conceptions of neutrality ¨C neutrality of impact, neutrality as equality of opportunity and justificatory neutrality ¨C and analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the different conceptions in different contexts. It suggests that there are two common elements of neutrality in all its exemplifications: a) an element of ¡°hands-off¡± and b) an element of equal treatment. It therefore argues that while justificatory neutrality is necessary for the state to be neutral it is not sufficient and claims that while conceptions of the good must not enter thejustificationof state regulations, they must be taken into consideration when deliberating theimplementation of these regulations. Il n¡¯est pas rare, dans des soci¨¦t¨¦s pluralistes, que les citoyens exigent de leur ¨¦tat qu¡¯il reste neutre eu ¨¦gard ¨¤ leurs conceptions de la vie bonne. Il est cependant rare que la notion de neutralit¨¦ de l¡¯¨¦tat soit clairement d¨¦limit¨¦e. Ce manque de clart¨¦ s¡¯explique de deux fa ons: d¡¯une part, pour la raison qu¡¯il existe plusieurs conceptions de la neutralit¨¦ et, d¡¯autre part, parce que la neutralit¨¦ d¨¦pend essentiellement du contexte dans lequel celle-ci est requise. Cet article examine trois conceptions diff¨¦rentes de la neutralit¨¦ - neutralit¨¦ de l¡¯impact, neutralit¨¦ comme ¨¦galit¨¦ des opportunit¨¦s et neutralit¨¦ de la justification - et analyse les forces et les faiblesses de chacune dans des contextes diff¨¦rents. Cette analyse sugg¨¨re qu¡¯il existe deux ¨¦l¨¦ments constitutifs de la neutralit¨¦, communs ¨¤ toutes ses diff¨¦rentes illustrations: a) un ¨¦l¨¦ment de non-intervention et b) un ¨¦l¨¦ment de traitement ¨¦gal. Ainsi, cet article soutient que m¨ºme si la neutralit¨¦ de la justification demeure n¨¦cessaire pour assurer la neutralit¨¦ de l¡¯¨¦tat, elle n¡¯est pourtant pas suffisante, ce qui permet de soutenir que m¨ºme si les conceptions de la vie bonne ne doivent pas interf¨¦rer dans le processus de justification des r¨¦gulations ¨¦tatiques, elles doivent n¨¦anmoins ¨ºtre prises en consid¨¦ration lors des d¨¦lib¨¦rations de la mise en  uvre de ces r¨¦gulations.
%K ¨¦thique appliqu¨¦e
%K neutralit¨¦
%K lib¨¦ralisme
%U http://creum.umontreal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/pdf_13_Zellentin.pdf