%0 Journal Article
%T Propri¨¦t¨¦ de soi et indiff¨¦rence morale du rapport ¨¤ soi
%A Nathalie Maillard Romagnoli
%J Les Ateliers de l¡¯¨¦thique
%D 2011
%I Universit¨¦ de Montr¨¦al
%X Je m¡¯interroge dans cet article sur les implications du principe libertarien de la pleine propri¨¦t¨¦ de soi sur la question du rapport moral ¨¤ soi-m¨ºme. ¨¤ travers le principe de la pleine propri¨¦t¨¦ de soi, les libertariens d¨¦fendent la libert¨¦ enti¨¨re de chacun de vivre comme il l¡¯entend, pourvu que les droits des autres soient respect¨¦s. Apparemment, ce principe n¡¯a pas grand-chose ¨¤ nous dire sur ce que nous sommes moralement autoris¨¦s ¨¤ nous faire ¨¤ nous-m¨ºmes ou non. Certains libertariens, comme Vallentyne, soutiennent toutefois que le principe de la pleine propri¨¦t¨¦ de soi est incompatible avec l¡¯existence de devoirs envers soi. La pleine propri¨¦t¨¦ de soi impliquerait l¡¯indiff¨¦rence morale du rapport ¨¤ soi. Je soutiens dans cet article que le principe de la pleine propri¨¦t¨¦ de soi n¡¯implique pas que ce que nous nous faisons ¨¤ nous-m¨ºmes soit moralement indiff¨¦rent. Je veux aussi montrer que m¨ºme si les libertariens, et en particulier Vallentyne, soutiennent la th¨¨se de l¡¯indiff¨¦rence morale du rapport ¨¤ soi, celle-ci n¡¯est pas li¨¦e ¨¤ la th¨¨se de la pleine propri¨¦t¨¦ de soi, mais bien plut t ¨¤ leur subjectivisme moral.ABSTRACTI ask in this article what the libertarian principle of full self-ownership has to say about volontary actions directed towards oneself. Through the principle of full self-ownership, libertarians defend the persons¡¯ individual liberty to live as they choose to do, as long as they don¡¯t infringe on the rights of others. Apparently, this principle doesn¡¯t have much to say about what we are morally allowed to do to ourselves or not. Some libertarians, however, like Vallentyne, maintain that, if we have duties or obligations to ourselves, then we cannot be full self-owner. In this perspective, full self-ownership would imply that what we do to ourselves is morally indifferent. I want to show in this article that full self-ownership is compatible with the existence of duties to ourselves. I also want to argue that, if libertarians, and in particular Vallentyne, assert the thesis of the moral indifference of what we do to ourselves, this is not a consequence of the selfownership thesis, but of their own moral subjectivism.
%K philosophy
%K ethics
%K ownership of self
%K meta-ethics
%U http://www.creum.umontreal.ca/IMG/pdf_01_Romagnoli.pdf