%0 Journal Article %T Neutrality and the social contract %A Ian J. Carroll %J Les Ateliers de l¡¯¨¦thique %D 2009 %I Universit¨¦ de Montr¨¦al %X Given the fact of moral disagreement, theories of state neutrality which rely on moral premises will have limited application, in that they will fail to motivate anyone who rejects the moral premises on which they are based. By contrast, contractarian theories can be consistent with moral scepticism, and can therefore avoid this limitation. In this paper, I construct a contractarian model which I claim is sceptically consistent and includes a principle of state neutrality as a necessary condition. The principle of neutrality which I derive incorporates two conceptions of neutrality (consequential neutrality and justificatory neutrality) which have usually been thought of as distinct and incompatible. I argue that contractarianism gives us a unified account of these conceptions. Ultimately, the conclusion that neutrality can be derived without violating the constraint established by moral scepticism turns out to rely on an assumption of equal precontractual bargaining power. I do not attempt to defend this assumption here. If the assumption cannot be defended in a sceptically consistent fashion, then the argument for neutrality given here is claimed to be morally minimal, rather than fully consistent with moral scepticism. L¡¯existence d¡¯un d¨¦saccord sur les questions morales fait en sorte que les constructions th¨¦oriques de la neutralit¨¦ de l¡¯¨¦tat se fondant sur des pr¨¦misses morales ne peuvent avoir qu¡¯une application limit¨¦e, car elles ¨¦chouent ¨¤ motiver quiconque rejette ces pr¨¦misses fondatrices. Par opposition, les th¨¦ories contractualistes peuvent s¡¯accommoder d¡¯un scepticisme moral et peuvent donc ¨¦viter cette limitation. Cet article d¨¦veloppe un mod¨¨le contractualiste compatible avec le scepticisme et qui inclut comme condition n¨¦cessaire la neutralit¨¦ de l¡¯¨¦tat. Le principe de neutralit¨¦ que je d¨¦rive ¨¤ partir de ce mod¨¨le incorpore deux conceptions de la neutralit¨¦, soit la neutralit¨¦ des cons¨¦quences et la neutralit¨¦ de la justification. Ces deux conceptions sont souvent consid¨¦r¨¦es comme ¨¦tant distinctes et incompatibles; ¨¤ l¡¯oppos¨¦, je soutiens que le contractualisme peut en rendre compte de mani¨¨re unifi¨¦e. L¡¯op¨¦ration qui consiste ¨¤ d¨¦river la neutralit¨¦ ¨¤ partir du mid¨¨le esquiss¨¦, sans violer la contrainte ¨¦tablie par un scepticisme moral, repose en bout de piste sur la supposition d¡¯une ¨¦galit¨¦ pr¨¦contractuelle du pouvoir de n¨¦gociation. Or,cette hypoth¨¨se n¡¯est pas d¨¦fendue ici. Si cette hypoth¨¨se ne peut ¨ºtre d¨¦fendue de mani¨¨re compatible avec le scepticisme, alors l¡¯argument pour la neutralit¨¦ d¨¦velopp¨¦ dans cet article est moraleme %K ¨¦thique appliqu¨¦e %K neutralit¨¦ %K lib¨¦ralisme %U http://creum.umontreal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/pdf_11_Carroll.pdf