%0 Journal Article
%T Beyond Objective and Subjective: Assessing the Legitimacy of Religious Claims to Accommodation
%A Daniel Weinstock
%J Les Ateliers de l¡¯¨¦thique
%D 2011
%I Universit¨¦ de Montr¨¦al
%X There are at present two ways in which to evaluate religiously-based claims to accommodation in the legal context. The first, objective approach holds that these claims should be grounded in   facts of the matter   about the religions in question. The second, subjective approach, is grounded in an appreciation by the courts of the sincerity of the claimant. The first approach has the advantage of accounting for the difference between two constitutional principles : freedom of conscience on the one hand, and freedom of religion on the other. It has the disadvantage of transforming courts into expert bodies on religious matters. The subjective approach has a harder time accounting for the distinction. It also risks giving rise to a proliferation of claims. A plausible synthesis between the two approaches requires that we uncover the normative grounds justifying the granting by liberal democracies of religious accommodation. An analogous argument to that put forward by Kymlicka in the case of minority nations identifies the interest that citizens have in being able to exercise their   cultural agency   : the creative reappropriation and reinterpretation of the rituals, practices and norms of religious traditions.Il existe ¨¤ l¡¯heure actuelle dans le contexte juridique deux principales approches ¨¤ l¡¯¨¦valuation de la l¨¦gitimit¨¦ des demandes d¡¯accommodement pour des motifs religieux. La premi¨¨re, objective, affirme que ces demandes doivent pouvoir s¡¯appuyer dans des faits concernant la religion en question. La seconde, subjective, s¡¯appuie sur l¡¯appr¨¦ciation de la sinc¨¦rit¨¦ de la demande faite par le requ¨¦rant. La premi¨¨re approche a l¡¯avantage de rendre compte de la distinction entre les deux principes constitutionnels que sont, d¡¯une part, la libert¨¦ de conscience, et de l¡¯autre, la libert¨¦ de religion. Elle a l¡¯inconv¨¦nient de tendre ¨¤ ¨¦riger les tribunaux en   experts   sur des questions religieuses. L¡¯approche subjective rend plus difficilement compte de la distinction entre les deux principes, et de plus risque de donner lieu ¨¤ une prolif¨¦ration de demandes. Pour atteindre une synth¨¨se plausible de ces deux approches, il nous faut identifier les fondements normatifs justifiant l¡¯int¨¦r¨ºt que les d¨¦mocraties lib¨¦rales ont ¨¤ reconna tre une telle cat¨¦gorie d¡¯accommodements. En prenant appui dans le c¨¦l¨¨bre argument de Kymlicka justifiant les droits de nations minoritaires, nous pouvons identifier un int¨¦r¨ºt que ces types d¡¯¨¦tat ont ¨¤ prot¨¦ger les conditions permettant aux citoyens de manifester leur   agentivit¨¦ culturelle  , leur capacit¨¦ ¨¤ s¡¯identifier en
%K ethics
%K multiculturalism
%K law
%K religious neutrality
%U http://www.erudit.org/revue/ateliers/2011/v6/n2/1008036ar.pdf