%0 Journal Article
%T Bentham and Mill on the ¡®quality¡¯ of Pleasures
%A Francisco Vergara
%J Revue d¡¯¨¦tudes Benthamiennes
%D 2011
%I Centre Bentham
%R 10.4000/etudes-benthamiennes.422
%X John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham are often said to have held opposed views concerning the way ¡°the value¡± of different pleasures should be estimated. Mill is accused of being an inconsistent utilitarian because he thought that, when comparing the value of two pleasures, we should not forget to take their ¡°quality¡± into account. Bentham, on the other hand, is said to have believed that we should take ¡°only quantity¡± into consideration. By verifying what they actually wrote, and reflecting on what they meant by words like ¡°value¡±, ¡°quantity¡±, and ¡°quality¡±, we find that these allegations are largely imaginary and that the difference between Mill and Bentham has (at least) been exaggerated. Bentham, for example, did not write that "quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry", as is so often reported. In his Principles of Morals and Legislation he clearly tells us why he rejects the inaccurate word ¡°quantity¡±, when speaking of ¡°the value of a lot of pain or pleasure¡±, and he explicitly introduces ¡°quality¡± (both the word and the concept) in his analysis of rewards and punishments. These clarifications allow us to sort-out a few other confusions concerning utilitarianism. We explain, for example, why authors like Amartya Sen and Michael Sandel are mistaken in believing that rights and freedoms have ¡°no intrinsic value¡± (only instrumental value) in utilitarian ethics On affirme souvent que John Stuart Mill et Jeremy Bentham avaient des opinions oppos¨¦es concernant la mani¨¨re dont un utilitariste devait estimer   la valeur   des diff¨¦rents plaisirs. Mill est accus¨¦ d¡¯avoir ¨¦t¨¦ incoh¨¦rent (par rapport au principe d¡¯utilit¨¦) car il pensait que, lorsqu¡¯on compare la valeur de deux plaisirs, il ne faut pas oublier de tenir compte de leur   qualit¨¦  . Bentham, par contre, aurait soutenu que nous devons tenir compte   uniquement de la quantit¨¦  . En v¨¦rifiant ce qu¡¯ils ont effectivement ¨¦crit, et en s¡¯interrogeant sur ce qu¡¯ils entendaient par les mots   valeur  ,   quantit¨¦   et   qualit¨¦  , nous trouvons que ces all¨¦gations sont largement imaginaires et que les diff¨¦rences entre Bentham et Mill sur ce point ont ¨¦t¨¦ (pour le moins) exag¨¦r¨¦es. Nous constatons, par exemple, que le c¨¦l¨¨bre aphorisme qu¡¯on attribue si souvent ¨¤ Bentham   si la quantit¨¦ de plaisir est la m¨ºme, le ¡®push-pin¡¯ (un jeu d¡¯enfants, comme la marelle) est aussi bon que la po¨¦sie  , n¡¯est pas de lui1. Dans son Principles of Morals and Legislation il explique pourquoi il rejette le mot   quantit¨¦   lorsqu¡¯il parle de   la valeur d¡¯un lot de plaisirs et peines  . Ensuite, d
%K Bentham
%K quality
%K quantity
%K pleasures
%K qualitative hedonism
%K qualitative utilitarianism
%K Mill
%K Bentham
%K qualit¨¦
%K quantit¨¦
%K plaisirs
%K h¨¦donisme qualitatif
%K utilitarisme qualitatif
%K Mill
%U http://etudes-benthamiennes.revues.org/422