%0 Journal Article
%T Intentional Explanations and Teleological Explanations of Animal Behaviour.
%A Dan¨Žn
%A Laura
%J Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento
%D 2011
%I Universidad de C¨Žrdoba
%X This paper examines two philosophical proposals about the requirements which must be satisfied in order to legitimately apply intentional explanations to non-human animals. Firstly, I evaluate Daniel DennettĄ¯s intentional stance approach, and I present a well-known critique against it: the risk of over-attribution of intentional states that it comports. Secondly, I turn to Mark OkrentĄ¯s attempt to refine DennettĄ¯s original position, by distinguishing between an intentional stance and a teleological one. Even when this strategy seems useful to deal with the problem of over-attribution of intentionality, it faces its own problems. As I will try to show, there are behaviors of non-human animals that can be explained neither by the teleological stance, nor by the intentional stance. Finally, I will suggest that, in order to overcome this problem, OkrentĄ¯s requirements for the legitimate application of the intentional stance should be revised and mitigated.
%K Intentional Stance
%K Teleological Stance
%K Animal Cognition
%K Intentional Attribution
%U http://www.psyche.unc.edu.ar/racc/index.php/comportamiento/article/view/75/Danon