%0 Journal Article
%T Phenomenal Knowledge without Phenomenal Concepts? On Jesse Prinz¡¯ Theory of Mental Pointers.
%A Barberis
%A Sergio Daniel
%J Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento
%D 2011
%I Universidad de C¨®rdoba
%X The aim of the present paper is to present and criticize the reply of Jesse Prinz (2007) to the ¡°knowledge argument¡± proposed by Jackson (1982). Prinz¡¯ proposal relies on two tenets: in the first place, it is supported by an original neurocognitive theory about consciousness; in the second place, it rests on a philosophical theory about phenomenal knowledge that seems to avoid the supposition of phenomenal concepts (versus Loar, Tye and Papineau, inter alia). I argue that Prinz¡¯ proposal is inadequate both on empirical grounds ¨C concerning his theory of consciousness ¨C and on more conceptual grounds ¨C concerning his conception of phenomenal knowledge. I conclude that the postulation of phenomenal concepts seems to be unavoidable in order to explain the nature of phenomenal knowledge.
%K Phenomenal Knowledge
%K Consciousness
%K Attention
%K Phenomenal Concepts
%K Mental Pointers.
%U http://www.psyche.unc.edu.ar/racc/index.php/comportamiento/article/view/76/Barberis