%0 Journal Article
%T Psicolog¨ªa Fenomenol¨®gica de Husserl y Sartre
%A Francois H. Lapointe
%J Revista Latinoamericana de Psicolog¨ªa
%D 1970
%I Fundaci¨®n Universitaria Konrad Lorenz
%X By phenomenological epoche, Husserl reduced his natural human ego, his psychic life -the realm of his psychological self-experience to his transcendental ego, the realm of transcendental - phenomenological self-experience. The transcendental ego is not the human ego in a body in the world, but the ultimete source wh¨ªch has emerged from the world and contains it Rather than as a part of the natural world Husserl discovers the transcendental ego as constituting the world by being the source of its meaning and objectivity. Husserl¡äs transcendental ego,then, is the source of objectivity and constitutes the world through intentional acts: Sartre¡äs disagreement with Husserl centers in the transcendental ego which Husserl,after the reductions, finds to be presiding over consciousness. For Sartre the ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness:it is outside, in the world. It is a being of the world, like the ego of another. Sartre has no need for the transcendental ego as the unifier of the contents of consciousness,for consciousness has no contente All content is on the side of the object. In "The Tranl/lCendenceof the Ego" Sartre outlines - in a Husserlian perspective, but contrary ro some of Husserl¡äs theories- the relation-ship between the self and the conscious mind, and also establishes a distinction, which he was to maintain permanently, between the conscious mind and the psyche. This forms a starting point for a radical revision of psychology.
%U http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=80502306