%0 Journal Article
%T La naturalidad del escepticismo
%A Jes¨˛s Antonio Coll M¨˘rmol
%J Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology
%D 2012
%I Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil
%X In this article I examine M. WilliamsĄŻ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices. I admit that this strategy is really promising, especially when applied to Cartesian scepticism. However, when it faces an older ancestor of Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism, this situation changes. I concentrate on FogelinĄŻs neopyrrhonist proposal and how WilliamsĄŻ strategy would face it. I will defend that Pyrrhonian scepticism is a completely natural kind of scepticism according to our epistemic practices. I will also maintain that this kind of skepticism is the unavoidable result of reflecting about those epistemic practices.
%K Skepticism
%K pyrrhonism
%K Michel Williams
%K Robert Fogelin
%K levels of scrutiny
%U http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n2p277/24102