%0 Journal Article
%T C車mo act迆an las empresas frente a la dependencia econ車mica del auditor?: el papel del comit谷 de auditor赤a
%A Est赤baliz Biedma L車pez
%A Emiliano Ruiz Barbadillo
%A Nieves Gomez Aguilar
%J Revista de Contabilidad : Spanish Accounting Review
%D 2011
%I Elsevier
%X ABSTRACTLiterature states that the auditor＊s economic bond on a client company could undermine auditor independence. One of the primary functions of an audit committee is to safeguard auditor independence. However, the audit committee is a mechanism within the governance structure of the client firm. Therefore, it depends on this firm that its audit committee possesses the characteristics necessary to be effective. This study analyses whether firms＊ decision regarding the degree of independence of the audit committee is determined by the level of economic dependence of their auditors. By mean of a panel data analysis in a sample of Spanish companies between 1998 and 2005, results confirm the existence of a significant relation between the level of independence of the audit committee and the degree of economic dependence of the auditor.Moreover, firms with auditors less economically dependent are those which establish more independent audit committees. These results represent an important contribution to previous literature as provide evidence concerning the strategy followed by firms in the joint design of mechanisms which guarantee the quality of financial reporting system. In addition, they were obtained taking into consideration some of the methodological limitations that have been identified as major obstacles in research on corporate governance, such as endogeneity and unobservable heterogeneity.RESUMENLa dependencia econ車mica del auditor respecto de su cliente es considerada una amenaza para su independencia. El comit谷 de auditor赤a puede actuar como salvaguarda, sin embargo, es una medida creada por la empresa auditada y de ella depende que cuente con las caracter赤sticas necesarias para ser eficaz. Este trabajo analiza si las empresas grad迆an el nivel de independencia del comit谷 de auditor赤a dependiendo del nivel de dependencia econ車mica de su auditor. Aplicando la t谷cnica de datos de panel a una muestra de empresas espa olas cotizadas entre los a os 1998 y 2005, los resultados confirman la existencia de una relaci車n significativa entre el nivel de independencia del comit谷 de auditor赤a y el nivel de dependencia econ車mica del auditor, siendo las empresas con auditores menos dependientes las que forman comit谷s m芍s independientes. Estos resultados suponen una importante contribuci車n a la literatura previa en tanto que aportan evidencia sobre la estrategia seguida por las empresas en el dise o conjunto de mecanismos de garant赤a de la calidad de la informaci車n financiera. Asimismo, se han obtenido teniendo en cuenta algunas de las limitaciones metodol車
%K auditor independence
%K economic dependence
%K audit committee
%K audit committee independence
%K audit committee composition
%K corporate governance mechanisms.
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