%0 Journal Article
%T Gasto en campa a y ¨¦xito electoral de los candidatos a diputados en chile 2005 Campaign Expenditure and Electoral Succes for Candidates to the House of Representative in Chile in 2005
%A MAURICIO MORALES QUIROGA
%A RAFAEL PI£¿EIRO RODR¨ªGUEZ
%J Revista de Ciencia Pol¨ªtica
%D 2010
%I Pontificia Universidad Cat¨®lica de Chile
%X Al contrario de lo que se ala parte importante de la teor¨ªa, el gasto de campa a tiene un efecto significativo sobre el ¨¦xito electoral de los incumbentes en la elecci¨®n de diputados de 2005 en Chile. M¨¢s a¨²n, los rendimientos electorales del gasto son mayores para los candidatos con m¨¢s de un per¨ªodo en el cargo. El gasto de campa a parece no s¨®lo sumarse a las "ventajas" de los incumbentes, sino multiplicar su efecto sobre el rendimiento electoral. En segundo lugar, se aprecia que los incumbentes que ganaron en 2001 por mayores m¨¢rgenes dentro de su pacto tienden a mostrar -contrario a lo esperable- mayor gasto de campa a. Por un lado, este hecho va en l¨ªnea con la idea de que los candidatos tienden a percibir que su gasto multiplica sus cualidades y no parece presentar rendimientos marginales decrecientes. Este comportamiento tambi¨¦n se ve reforzado por la l¨®gica del financiamiento p¨²blico de campa as, que reembolsa dinero de acuerdo a la votaci¨®n obtenida y hace que, como sugiere la teor¨ªa, la decisi¨®n de gasto est¨¦ influida por las expectativas de obtener un mayor subsidio. Contrary to what an important part of the theory says campaign expenditure has a significant effect on the electoral success of incumbents in the House of Representatives elections of 2005 in Chile. Moreover, electoral performance of expenditure is greater for those candidates with more than one period in office. Campaign expenditure not only adds to the "incumbency advantages" of incumbents, but also multiplies their effect on electoral performance. Secondly, it is assessed that incumbents who won in 2001 by greater margins in their coalition tend to show greater campaign expenditures (contrary to what was expected). On one hand, this fact is coherent with the idea that candidates tend to perceive that their expenses multiply their qualities and do not present diminishing returns. This behavior is also reinforced by rationale of the public campaign financing, which reimburses money according to votes attained and makes, as theory suggests that the decision to spend be influenced by the expectations of getting a greater subsidy.
%K Gasto en campa as
%K incumbencia
%K elecciones
%K partidos
%K Chile
%K Campaign expenditure
%K incumbency
%K elections
%K parties
%K Chile
%U http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-090X2010000300004