%0 Journal Article
%T Two externalist accounts of epistemic justification
%A Lazovi£¿ £¿ivan
%J Theoria, Beograd
%D 2011
%I Serbian Philosophical Society, Belgrade
%R 10.2298/theo1101005l
%X This article deals with two prominent versions of externalist account of epistemic justification, the reliable indication theory and the reliable process theory. According to the reliable indication theory, a belief is justified if it provides a reliable indication of the occurence of the state of affairs which makes it true. The reliable process theory holds that a belief is justified if it has been formed by a reliable cognitive process. The main contentions of this two accounts are analyzed and compared in the light of three more general and fundamental externalist ideas: (1) justification need not be cognitive available to the person whose belief is in question; (2) justification should be connected to the truth of the belief in such a way that it makes the case that one¡¯s epistemically justified belief is likely to be true; and (3) justification of one¡¯s belief depends on the causal history of the belief.
%K epistemic justification
%K belief¡¯s causal history
%K reliable indication
%K reliable process
%U http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0351-2274/2011/0351-22741101005L.pdf