%0 Journal Article
%T The Rationale of Variation in Methodological and Evidential Pluralism
%A Federica Russo
%J Philosophica
%D 2006
%I Ghent University
%X Causal analysis in the social sciences takes advantage of a variety of methods and of a multi-fold source of information and evidence. This pluralistic methodology and source of information raises the question of whether we should accordingly have a pluralistic metaphysics and epistemology. This paper focuses on epistemology and argues that a pluralistic methodology and evidence don t entail a pluralistic epistemology. It will be shown that causal models employ a single rationale of testing, based on the notion of variation. Further, I shall argue that this monistic epistemology is also involved in alternative philosophical theories of causation.
%U http://logica.ugent.be/philosophica/fulltexts/77-5.pdf