%0 Journal Article
%T ¡®Bodiless Bodies¡¯: Perception and Embodiment in Kant and Irigaray
%A Laura K. Green
%J Perspectives : International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy
%D 2008
%I 
%X This paper begins with a brief analysis of Immanuel Kant¡¯s account of perception in the Critique of Pure Reason, and analyses Luce Irigaray¡¯s critique of Kant in Speculum of the Other Woman, in order that we may better understand the position Irigaray adopts with regards to the notion of embodied ¡®perception¡¯ ¨C a key theme in her recent text To Be Two. Part II examines Irigaray¡¯s argument in An Ethics of Sexual Difference, with particular reference to themes of ¡®dwelling¡¯, ¡®embodiment¡¯ and ¡®space-time¡¯. By denying the body representation within discourse, Irigaray argues that the Kantian transcendental subject conceals sexuate difference and buries the ¡®feminine¡¯. Hence perception is not conceived as an ethical relationship between two embodied subjects, but as one of knowledge between a transcendental subject and an ¡®object¡¯. This enterprise is intended to lend clarity to Irigaray¡¯s vision of embodied subjectivity and alterity in her later works.
%K Perception
%K transcendental
%K space-time
%K dwelling
%K sexuate difference
%U http://www.ucd.ie/philosophy/perspectives/resources/greene_bodiles_bodies.pdf