%0 Journal Article
%T La Pieza China:  un experimento mental con sesgo cartesiano?
%A Rodrigo Gonz¨˘lez
%J Revista Chilena de Neuropsicologia
%D 2012
%I Universidad de La Frontera
%R 10.5839/rcnp.2012.0701.02
%X This article examines a classical thought experiment by John Searle in philosophy of mind, which Dennett and Hofstadter have accused as a non reliable intuition pump. As I argue here, although this thought experiment involves a Cartesian bias, this does not mean it is unreliable. Indeed, the Chinese Room most important feature is that it depends upon a conscious cognitive agent who performs the experiment and, in particular, someone who cannot be jettisoned in order to know whether or not linguistic under-standing takes place after symbol processing. Certainly, the first person viewpoint of the agent who carries out the experiment is, like in other instances, what allows one to test a hypothesis about the nature of the mind.
%K Chinese Room
%K thought experiment
%K intuition pump
%K Cartesian dualism
%U http://www.neurociencia.cl/dinamicos/articulos/987284-rcnp2012v7n1-1.pdf