%0 Journal Article
%T The Two Sides of the Representative Coin
%A Keith Sutherland
%J Studies in Social Justice
%D 2011
%I University of Windsor
%X In Federalist 10 James Madison drew a functional distinction between ¡°parties¡± (advocates for factional interests) and ¡°judgment¡± (decision-making for the public good) and warned of the corrupting effect of combining both functions in a ¡°single body of men.¡± This paper argues that one way of overcoming ¡°Madisonian corruption¡± would be by restricting political parties to an advocacy role, reserving the judgment function to an allotted (randomly-selected) microcosm of the whole citizenry, who would determine the outcome of parliamentary debates by secret ballot¡ªa division of labour suggested by James Fishkin¡¯s experiments in deliberative polling. The paper then defends this radical constitutional proposal against Bernard Manin¡¯s (1997) claim that an allotted microcosm could not possibly fulfil the ¡°consent¡± requirement of Natural Right theory. Not only does the proposal challenge Manin¡¯s thesis, but a 28th Amendment implementing it would finally reconcile the competing visions that have bedevilled representative democracy since the Constitutional Convention of 1787.
%K democracy
%K representation
%K Madison
%U http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/SSJ/article/view/3492