%0 Journal Article
%T OPTIMAL CONTRACTS OF THE MAIN-AGENT MODEL IN CONDITIONS OF SYMMETRIC INFORMATION
%A Tudor Colomeischi
%J Economics and Finance Review
%D 2011
%I Global Research Society
%X This paper draws up an approach over the Main Agent model, in conditions of information symmetry. At the beginning, the Main Agent model is emphasized in a general way, mentioning the main contributions brought in time on its development, its characteristics and the basic principles. Then, the hypothesis of the general model isillustrated, drawing a conclusion as regards the model¡¯s situations: Main neutral and Agent with risk aversion, Agent neutral and Main with risk aversion, and both partners having risk aversion.
%K symmetric information
%K Principal-Agent model
%K optimal contracts
%K optimal salary
%K optimal effort level
%U http://www.businessjournalz.org/articlepdf/efrn61609.pdf