%0 Journal Article
%T Will Science and Consciousness Ever Meat? Complexity, Symmetry and Qualia
%A Roger Vergauwen
%J Symmetry
%D 2010
%I MDPI AG
%R 10.3390/sym2031250
%X Within recent discussions in the Philosophy of Mind, the nature of conscious phenomenal states or qualia (also called ¡®raw feels¡¯ or the feel of ¡®what it is like to be¡¯) has been an important focus of interest. Proponents of Mind-Body Type-Identity theories have claimed that mental states can be reduced to neurophysiological states of the brain. Others have denied that such a reduction is possible; for them, there remains an explanatory gap. In this paper, functionalist, physicalist, epiphenomenalist, and biological models of the mind are discussed and compared. Donald Davidson¡¯s Anomalous Monism is proposed as a unifying framework for a non-reductive theory of qualia and consciousness. Downward Causation, Emergence through Symmetry-breaking, and Dynamical Systems Theory are used to show how consciousness and qualia emerge from their neural substrate and can also be causally efficacious.
%K anomalous monism
%K consciousness
%K downward causation
%K dynamical systems
%K qualia
%K symmetry-breaking
%U http://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/2/3/1250