%0 Journal Article
%T Converting the Strand Spaces'''' Algebraic Flaws to Actual Attacks<br>串空间代数缺陷到实际攻击的转换
%A SHENG Hai-Feng
%A HUANG He-Yan
%A CHEN Zhao-Xiong Dept of Computer Science
%A USTC
%A Hefei Engineering Research Center of Computer Language Information
%A CAS
%A Beijing
%A <br>沈海峰
%A 黄河燕
%A 陈肇雄
%J 计算机科学
%D 2005
%I 
%X We can conclude whether a protocol is defective according to the algebraic result after proving the protocol's security. But the algebraic result doesn't tell us explicitly how the actual attack takes place. In this paper, we propose four heuristic rules for converting the algebraic result to actual attack, and use them in Needham-Schroed- er public protocol as well as Otway-Rees symmetrical protocol. Practical evidences indicate that these four rules are very efficient in converting Strand Spaces' algebraic flaws to actual attacks.
%K Cryptographic protocols
%K Strand spaces
%K Algebraic flaw
%K Heuristic rule<br>串空间
%K 攻击
%K 缺陷
%K 代数
%K 启发式规则
%K 密钥协议
%K Rees
%K 安全性
%K 公钥
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=5B3AB970F71A803DEACDC0559115BFCF0A068CD97DD29835&cid=8240383F08CE46C8B05036380D75B607&jid=64A12D73428C8B8DBFB978D04DFEB3C1&aid=2B23F8408CB14F7D&yid=2DD7160C83D0ACED&vid=9971A5E270697F23&iid=DF92D298D3FF1E6E&sid=869807E2D7BED9EC&eid=08805F9252973BA4&journal_id=1002-137X&journal_name=计算机科学&referenced_num=0&reference_num=9