%0 Journal Article
%T System dynamics of behaviour-evolutionary mix-game models<br>
%A Gou Cheng-Ling
%A Gao Jie-Ping
%A Chen Fang
%A <br>
%J 中国物理 B
%D 2010
%I 
%X In real financial markets there are two kinds of traders: one is fundamentalist, and the other is a trend-follower. The mix-game model is proposed to mimic such phenomena. In a mix-game model there are two groups of agents: Group 1 plays the majority game and Group 2 plays the minority game. In this paper, we investigate such a case that some traders in real financial markets could change their investment behaviours by assigning the evolutionary abilities to agents: if the winning rates of agents are smaller than a threshold, they will join the other group; and agents will repeat such an evolution at certain time intervals. Through the simulations, we obtain the following findings: (i) the volatilities of systems increase with the increase of the number of agents in Group 1 and the times of behavioural changes of all agents; (ii) the performances of agents in both groups and the stabilities of systems become better if all agents take more time to observe their new investment behaviours; (iii) there are two-phase zones of market and non-market and two-phase zones of evolution and non-evolution; (iv) parameter configurations located within the cross areas between the zones of markets and the zones of evolution are suited for simulating the financial markets.
%K minority game model
%K mix-game model
%K behavioural evolution
%K system dynamics<br>
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=6E709DC38FA1D09A4B578DD0906875B5B44D4D294832BB8E&cid=47EA7CFDDEBB28E0&jid=CD8D6A6897B9334F09D8D1648C376FB4&aid=9EA0C4F5B672837ED199E8BDE8145CB5&yid=140ECF96957D60B2&vid=2A8D03AD8076A2E3&iid=708DD6B15D2464E8&journal_id=1009-1963&journal_name=中国物理&referenced_num=0&reference_num=24