%0 Journal Article
%T A Study on Satisfactory Incentive Mechanism When the Follower''s Preference Information is Incomplete<br>关于从方偏好信息不完全时的满意激励机制研究
%A Jin Wu
%A Wang Xianjia
%A Chen Ting
%A <br>金武
%A 王先甲
%A 陈珽
%J 自动化学报
%D 1996
%I 
%X In this paper, the Stackelberg game when the follower has multiple objectives,whose preference structure information is unknown to the leader is studied. The optimal incentive strategy when the follower has multiple objectives is presented.The satisfactory incentive mechanism from the leader to the follower is investigated.
%K Stackelberg game
%K incentive strategy
%K incentive mechanism<br>主从对策
%K 诱导策略
%K 激励机制
%K 满意机制
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=5B3AB970F71A803DEACDC0559115BFCF0A068CD97DD29835&cid=8240383F08CE46C8B05036380D75B607&jid=E76622685B64B2AA896A7F777B64EB3A&aid=7F837BFF2877F7AC40A2BFBF61117140&yid=8A15F8B0AA0E5323&vid=BC12EA701C895178&iid=E158A972A605785F&sid=5824536C90612D67&eid=BD7D27247C63490C&journal_id=0254-4156&journal_name=自动化学报&referenced_num=0&reference_num=3