%0 Journal Article
%T Knowledge Transaction<br>知识交易
%A JIN Xiang-rong
%A ZHU Xi-wei
%A <br>金祥荣
%A 朱希伟
%J 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)
%D 2001
%I 
%X An asymmetry of information exists between bargaining parties in knowledge transaction. Sellers may reveal relevant infor-mation to buyers, which will eliminate the asymmetry but induce free riding. While buyers' behavior is subjected to its own factors, sellers can reduce free riding through designation of distribution systems. All the interactions will result in a continuous price increase for knowledge goods.
%K knowledge
%K "free riding"
%K comparative static studies<br>知识
%K "搭便车”行为
%K 比较静态分析
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1924CB483152CA50D4FC5BD3CBB47B847F&cid=585D04A2453D8AD5DDFFE8BE5B16E24C&jid=D60DCFE5A8F7BD187924CADC70161E70&aid=E8115526C21210EA&yid=14E7EF987E4155E6&vid=4AD960B5AD2D111A&iid=94C357A881DFC066&sid=F122871CC7EC92DC&eid=76B5E24D6EC46B4B&journal_id=1008-942X&journal_name=浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)&referenced_num=1&reference_num=4