%0 Journal Article
%T Accounting Information and the Design of Managers'''' Incentive Contract<br>会计信息与经理人激励契约设计
%A YANG De-ming
%A <br>杨德明
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2007
%I 
%X In practice,there are so popular to earnings management.But accounting information usually is used to performance evaluation.Our paper use a model of client-agent to analyse the relation between accounting information and the design of managers' incentive contracts.The model reveal incentive contracts should permit appropriate managers' earnings management.Our paper also show that the reliability of accounting information,efficiency of managers,managers' coefficient of risk aversion would affect the operation of accounting information in incentive contracts.
%K accounting information
%K earnings management
%K performance evaluation
%K incentive contracts
%K model of client-agent<br>会计信息
%K 盈余管理
%K 业绩评价
%K 激励契约
%K 委托代理模型
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=5D5A9C97D6AE4F1C&yid=A732AF04DDA03BB3&vid=DB817633AA4F79B9&iid=E158A972A605785F&sid=95D537AC89B28832&eid=5C3443B19473A746&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=0&reference_num=14