%0 Journal Article
%T Study on the Contract in Delegated Portfolio Management When the Manager Possesses Market Power<br>管理者具有市场能力的委托组合投资管理合同研究
%A SHENG Ji-liang
%A MA Yong-kai
%A <br>盛积良
%A 马永开
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2007
%I 
%X We study the incentive of a linear contract in the delegated portfolio management when the manager possesses market power.A linear contract provides incentives to the manager to work at acquiring information when the manager possesses market power,which affects the equilibrium price of securities in the market.Our conclusion is different to the exiting studies.The optimal effort is an increase function of the ratio of risk sharing to a risk-averse manager.Linear contract not only can make the optimal risk allocation between the investor and the manager,also incentive the manager to work hard.
%K market power
%K equilibrium price
%K contract
%K delegated portfolio management
%K incentive<br>市场能力
%K 均衡价格
%K 合同
%K 委托组合投资管理
%K 激励
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=657183E86C90C354EDDD9033D97449BA&yid=A732AF04DDA03BB3&vid=DB817633AA4F79B9&iid=F3090AE9B60B7ED1&sid=B6DA1AC076E37400&eid=8E6AB9C3EBAAE921&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=0&reference_num=22