%0 Journal Article
%T Study on the Payment Mechanism of Suppliers'''' Adverse Selection<br>一类供应商逆向选择问题的报酬机制研究
%A WANG Kan
%A |liang
%A SUN Li
%A |hui
%A WANG Long
%A |wei
%A <br>王刊良
%A 孙利辉
%A 王龙伟
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2002
%I 
%X In this paper, we use Revelation Principle to design a set of contracts to let supplier select, and get the true information about supplier according to their selecting result, under the circumstance that the information of the capability and the cost of suppliers are not available to the buyer side. Through analysis, we get the characteristics of optimal payment mechanism and prove that the proposed payment mechanism is independent of ex\|ante beliefs,which the buyer has on the capability and the cost of the supplier.
%K supplier
%K adverse selection
%K payment mechanism<br>供应商
%K 逆向选择
%K 报酬机制
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=4DF2C5BD7636FCA4&yid=C3ACC247184A22C1&vid=BC12EA701C895178&iid=9CF7A0430CBB2DFD&sid=6AC2A205FBB0EF23&eid=95D537AC89B28832&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=4&reference_num=6