%0 Journal Article
%T The Tunneling Effects of Controlling Minority Shareholder under Private Pyramid Structure-Empirical Evidences from China<br>民营金字塔结构下控制性少数股东隧道效应研究——来自我国上市公司的经验证据
%A HAN Zhi-li
%A YANG Shu-e
%A SHI Hao-jiang
%A <br>韩志丽
%A 杨淑娥
%A 史浩江
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2007
%I 
%X Based on the clearly defining of controlling minority shareholder,this paper analyzes the tunneling effects of controlling minority shareholder under private pyramid structure using the unbalanced panel data of Chinese private listed firms.The results indicate that the smaller the cash-flow right owned by controlling minority shareholder or the lower the ROA of the under layer firm or the worse the protection of investors,the more severely the tunneling to outside shareholder.Even if the smaller cash flow right or the lower ROA,the controlling minority shareholder will not made severely tunneling when the firm is in better investors legal protection environment.
%K pyramid structure
%K controlling minority shareholder
%K tunneling effects
%K agency problem<br>金字塔结构
%K 控制性少数股东
%K 隧道效应
%K 代理问题
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=35E1F0F12816F4CE&yid=A732AF04DDA03BB3&vid=DB817633AA4F79B9&iid=B31275AF3241DB2D&sid=CA4FD0336C81A37A&eid=B31275AF3241DB2D&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=0&reference_num=11