%0 Journal Article
%T Design of Mechanism and Bayesian Model of Water Rights Market<br>水权交易机制及博弈模型研究
%A LI Chang-jie
%A WANG Xian-jia
%A FAN Wen-tao
%A <br>李长杰
%A 王先甲
%A 范文涛
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2007
%I 
%X It is being a new direction of water management in the world to establish tradable water rights mechanism to improve the efficient of the use and allocation of water recourses,which can achieve the optimization allocation of water recourses.So water market and water rights have been widely discussed in recent years,in which the transactions modes and models of water rights are the core in water market study of theory and practice.Based on the market norm of double auction,this paper describes the auction process of double auction in water rights market,and establishes the Bayesian model in incomplete information of water rights double tradeoffs.A mechanism design of water rights double auction is given,including auction rule and market clearing rule,and the effectivity and incentive compatibility is proved.Lastly a model implementation is given.
%K water rights transaction
%K double auction
%K bayesian model
%K mechanism design
%K incentive compatible<br>水权交易
%K 双边拍卖
%K 贝叶斯博弈模型
%K 机制设计
%K 激励相容
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=DD86DC2240B5B6DC&yid=A732AF04DDA03BB3&vid=DB817633AA4F79B9&iid=94C357A881DFC066&sid=869807E2D7BED9EC&eid=BB0EA31DB1B01173&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=0&reference_num=15