%0 Journal Article
%T Evolutionary Game Method based on QBD for 2×2 Bimatrix Game with Stochastic Payoffs<br>基于拟生灭过程的随机支付2×2双矩阵博弈演化模型
%A YU Qian
%A WANG Xian-jia
%A <br>余谦
%A 王先甲
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2007
%I 
%X In this paper,the preferences on stochastic payoffs are defined by quantile,and the Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game with stochastic payoffs is given base on the preferences.And then,the bimatrix game with stochastic payoffs are modeled as a finite,state dependent quasi birth and death process for describing the adjust dynamic in the game with stochastic perturbation.The relations between the steady-state probabilities of the evolutionary game model and the long run equilibrium as well as Nash equilibrium are discussed also.Furthermore,an efficient numerical method based on block Gaussian elimination is proposed to compute the steady-state probabilities.In particular,some examples and numerical results are given to show the efficiency of this method.
%K quasi birth and death process
%K stochastic payoffs
%K bimatrix game
%K evolutionary game<br>拟生灭过程
%K 随机支付
%K 双矩阵博弈
%K 演化博弈
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=7CE8E87D9F2C6F02&yid=A732AF04DDA03BB3&vid=DB817633AA4F79B9&iid=38B194292C032A66&sid=014B591DF029732F&eid=95D537AC89B28832&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=0&reference_num=11