%0 Journal Article
%T The Game Model for Reducing the Security Risk of Chinese Commercial Bank<br>我国商业银行防范网络安全风险的博弈模型
%A QIAO Li-xin
%A YUAN Ai-ling
%A LI Shu-xia
%A FENG Ying-jun
%A <br>乔立新
%A 袁爱玲
%A 李淑霞
%A 冯英浚
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2006
%I 
%X In order to investigate the game behind the hackers and commercial banks,this paper analyzes the costs and profits about the attack and the defense of commercial banks & hackers,and studies the game status of hackers and commercial banks by signal game model.This paper figures that commercial banks should maintain its reputation at a higher level to prevent hacker's attack,and thus let the hacker to believe the profit will less than the average direct cost while making an attack.Regarding the cost,rational commercial banks may hope its marginal profit gained by the engagement in its reputation promotion equals to the banks' lose due to hacker's attack.This paper finally concluded that,the supervisor authorities should try to increase the inspection frequency about the status of commercial banks' network security,as well as increase the media exposing level about the losing status caused by network information security risk,and thus force the commercial banks to increase its investment on network security.
%K commercial bank
%K network security
%K game theory
%K hacker<br>商业银行
%K 网络安全
%K 博弈论
%K 骇客
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=72A87811687DC587&yid=37904DC365DD7266&vid=96C778EE049EE47D&iid=9CF7A0430CBB2DFD&sid=BE33CC7147FEFCA4&eid=771152D1ADC1C0EB&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=3&reference_num=12