%0 Journal Article
%T Optimal Auction Mechanism for Complements<br>互补性物品的最优拍卖机制
%A YIN Hong
%A WANG Xian-jia
%A <br>殷红
%A 王先甲
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2006
%I 
%X This paper studies the optimal auction mechanism for complements.Based on the design idea of single-object auction of Myerson,this paper builds the model of designing auction mechanism for complements and by solving the model gains the optimal auction mechanism only for the case of two objects.Then,a simple numerical example is given to show the application of this mechanism in auction.Further,the optimal auction mechanism is compared with several familiar auction mechanisms.The results show that the expected income of the seller is highest and the resource allocation is also most efficient in the optimal auction mechanism.
%K auction mechanism
%K complement
%K allocation efficiency
%K incentive compatibility<br>拍卖机制
%K 互补性
%K 激励相容
%K 配置有效
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=1B22F4526EB97683&yid=37904DC365DD7266&vid=96C778EE049EE47D&iid=9CF7A0430CBB2DFD&sid=BFE7933E5EEA150D&eid=8BD23BD67BF01A5C&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=0&reference_num=9