%0 Journal Article
%T Equilibrium analysis for affiliated effort contests model<br>关联竞赛模型参与选择及均衡策略
%A WANG Xian-jia
%A CHEN Wen-lei
%A FAN Wen-tao
%A <br>王先甲
%A 陈文磊
%A 范文涛
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2010
%I 
%X The winning probability of player in the contest depends not only on the player's effort,but on the opposition's participate strategy.In this paper,we construct an affiliated effort Contests model to depict the paly's winning probability and test the first-order necessary conditions to the existence of Nash equilibrium.Under the power distribution value,we analyzed the Nash equilibrium of symmetric and asymmetric value model.
%K contest
%K strategy equilibria
%K correlated effort<br>竞赛
%K 均衡策略
%K 关联努力
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=A54569F8D8D934A600951EF2F4B81A0C&yid=140ECF96957D60B2&vid=340AC2BF8E7AB4FD&iid=38B194292C032A66&sid=3054A11AD1D7E34A&eid=42D7028D961473F8&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=0&reference_num=13