%0 Journal Article
%T An Explanation of Game for Profit-conceal Behavior in Chinese State-owned Enterprises<br>我国国有企业隐瞒利润行为的一种博弈解释
%A FANG Yong
%A PU Yong-jian
%A <br>方涌
%A 蒲勇健
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2006
%I 
%X It is worth doubting that "low" benefit generally exists in China's state-owned enterprises.Game-analysis shows that failing supervision and problems of the exiting manager-selecting and appraisal mechanisms result in a state-owned enterprise not always reports its return according to facts,and managers with fluctuant income are more likely to lie than those with fixed income,under the same conditions.To safeguard position is the fundamental motive for SOE managers to conceal profit.Both reinforcing audit and improving selecting mechanism have to be carried out,in order to stop state-owned enterprise's flam.
%K state-owned enterprise
%K incomplete information
%K game theory<br>国有企业
%K 不完全信息
%K 博弈论
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=AA3EDA70C4AC6BE4&yid=37904DC365DD7266&vid=96C778EE049EE47D&iid=5D311CA918CA9A03&sid=ECE8E54D6034F642&eid=F4B561950EE1D31A&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=0&reference_num=12