%0 Journal Article
%T Strategic Trading When Some Investors Receive Partly Information<br>考虑不完全知情交易者的交易策略分析
%A PAN Deng
%A ZOU Yan
%A LIU Hai-long
%A WU Chong-feng
%A <br>攀登
%A 邹炎
%A 刘海龙
%A 吴冲锋
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2003
%I 
%X This paper models trading and price behavior in the equilibrium of a strategic trading game when some investors only receive partly information than informed trader. The model shows that the informed trader not only speculates but also manipulates the stock price. Under some condition, the informed trader may trade against his information to maintain the information superiority over market.
%K market microstructure
%K insider trading
%K market manipulation
%K asymmetric information<br>市场微观结构
%K 市场操纵
%K 内幕交易
%K 不对称信息
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=DEA20C32201FF585&yid=D43C4A19B2EE3C0A&vid=EA389574707BDED3&iid=F3090AE9B60B7ED1&sid=BC12EA701C895178&eid=771469D9D58C34FF&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=1&reference_num=14