%0 Journal Article
%T Evolutionary Stable Strategy of Duopolistic Retailing Market<br>双寡头零售市场的演化稳定策略
%A SHI Kui-ran~
%A <br>石岿然
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2004
%I 
%X Based on a three-stage Hotelling model, we study the evolutionary stable problem of price strategies in duopolistic retailing market. In the \ linear city game, two firms simultaneously choose their strategic variable in the first stage and determine the levels of their strategic variables and the corresponding probability of their price strategy in the second stage. In the third stage, consumers choose the firms. By using evolutionary game theory, we obtain the result that the High/Low pricing strategy is the unique evolutionary stable strategy.
%K duopolistic retailing market
%K price strategy
%K evolutionary game theory
%K evolutionary stable strategy<br>双寡头零售市场
%K 价格策略
%K 演化博弈论
%K 演化稳定策略
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=83A12C90E92D5CE1&yid=D0E58B75BFD8E51C&vid=B91E8C6D6FE990DB&iid=59906B3B2830C2C5&sid=B91E8C6D6FE990DB&eid=D3E34374A0D77D7F&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=7&reference_num=12