%0 Journal Article
%T Stackelberg Problem in Flood Hazard Mitigation<br>防洪减灾Stackelberg问题研究
%A ZHAO Yong
%A SUN Yong-guang
%A WU Zong-xin
%A <br>赵勇
%A 孙永广
%A 吴宗鑫
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2005
%I 
%X The purpose is to investigate the interactions and mter-impacts among governments at different levels in flood hazard mitigation. A two-level Stackelberg problem was established to model the flood hazard mitigation games among the central government and two interacting local governments. Rubinstein Law in Game Theory and Khun-Tucher Conditions for non-linear optimization problems helped in transforming the original problem into computable one. An overall searching algorithm finally solved the problem based on analysis of the feasible zone. Computation of two cases suggests that increase of investment in flood control by the central government tend to result in decrease of corresponding input by the local governments. This finding recommends that the central government should step down in its traditional role as a dominating investor and turn to stimulate local investments in the field of flood hazard mitigation.
%K flood hazard mitigation
%K Stackelberg problem
%K mechanism study
%K games<br>防洪减灾
%K Stackelberg问题
%K 机制研究
%K 博弈
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=E85AFEC9641B6C62&yid=2DD7160C83D0ACED&vid=C5154311167311FE&iid=0B39A22176CE99FB&sid=5D71B28100102720&eid=B9704B40A4225A24&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=0&reference_num=16