%0 Journal Article
%T Unit Demand Auction Mechanisms for Heterogeneous Objects Auction<br>一类异质物品拍卖机制收益等价性及应用
%A ZHANG E
%A WANG Ying-luo
%A <br>张　娥
%A 汪应洛
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2006
%I 
%X Symmetric Bayesin game theory is usually adopted to select a suitable kind of payment from Winner-pay and All-pay for a special case of heterogeneous object auction where different objects have relatedvalue and it is also widely used in Internet advertisement-place auctions and the activities of contest prize allocation.In this paper,we assume that each bidder has only one chance to summit a bid during a heterogeneous object auction.We mainly prove that the seller gains the same expected revenue in Winner-pay and All-pay auctions.However,bidders bid more aggressively in Winner-pay auction than in the other auction.Moreover,we specify our model to the single object auction and multi-unit homogeneous objects auction respectively,and conclude that seller's expected revenue is equal to k 1 sealed auction in k unit homogeneous objects auction.
%K heterogeneous objects auction
%K revenue equivalence
%K first price auction<br>异质物品拍卖
%K 收益相等
%K 广告位拍卖
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=AACDBED9D495C8A9&yid=37904DC365DD7266&vid=96C778EE049EE47D&iid=CA4FD0336C81A37A&sid=D767283A3B658885&eid=4DB1E72614E68564&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=0&reference_num=7