%0 Journal Article
%T Economic Analysis on Fundaments of the Recruitment Examination<br>关于选拔性考试若干基本问题的经济分析
%A DENG Wei
%A YANG Lei
%A CHEN Yuan-xu
%A <br>邓　伟
%A 杨　磊
%A 陈元旭
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2006
%I 
%X We use the auction theory to discuss the recruitment exam.In the benchmark model of exam,efficient allocation of positions can be accomplished by the exam and number of examinees and positions has different effect on different examinees.It is profitable to set a reserve score for a examiner who maximize winners' expected total scores.In the asymmetric exam,weaker new examinees may score more than stronger old examinees.The rent dissipation rate will be lower than 1 if there is not the reserve score.
%K recruitment examination
%K contests
%K rent dissipation<br>选拔性考试
%K 竞赛
%K 租值耗散
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=3661E605914DE643&yid=37904DC365DD7266&vid=96C778EE049EE47D&iid=E158A972A605785F&sid=BFE7933E5EEA150D&eid=5C3443B19473A746&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=0&reference_num=17