%0 Journal Article
%T An Analyzes on Complexity and Evolutionary Stability in Co-petition Games<br>合作竞争博弈中的复杂性与演化均衡的稳定性分析
%A WU Hao
%A YANG Mei-ying
%A CHEN Liang-you
%A <br>吴昊
%A 杨梅英
%A 陈良猷
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2004
%I 
%X From the bounded rationality of player in cooperation games, the sources of complexity are discussed. Based on this idea, the evolution model of co-petition games is studied, this is a replicator dynamics model, so we can describe the learning and adjustment of players by using the mechanism of replicator dynamics, and describe the evolution of co-petition in the long run by using the evolution stable strategy. At the end of this paper, the evolutionary equilibrium and stability of co-petition in a horizontal differential market are explored, the complexity in evolution is studied.
%K co-petition
%K game theory
%K bounded rationality
%K complexity
%K evolution<br>合作竞争
%K 博弈
%K 有限理性
%K 复杂性
%K 演化
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=D9BD225C06D33725&yid=D0E58B75BFD8E51C&vid=B91E8C6D6FE990DB&iid=0B39A22176CE99FB&sid=869807E2D7BED9EC&eid=BB0EA31DB1B01173&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=34&reference_num=7