%0 Journal Article
%T Analysis of Signaling Actions on Collateral under Asymmetric Information<br>不对称信息条件下抵押品的信号作用分析
%A LI Rong-zhou
%A PANG Su-lin{
%A }
%A XU Jian-min
%A LUO Wei-qi
%A <br>黎荣舟
%A 庞素琳
%A 徐建闽
%A 罗伟其
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2003
%I 
%X In this paper, we primary study two contents: 1) The effect of the changes of both the loan interest rate and the defaulting probability of the entrepreneur on the expected profits of the banks when the entrepreneur pursues opportunity benefit under asymmetric information. 2) The effect of the change of the loan interest rate on the average successful probability of the project of the entrepreneur when the entrepreneur have multi-continuous projects under asymmetric information. The studies show that, the less collateral value the entrepreneur provides is, the higher credit risk to the bank is and the larger risk of adverse selection is; the more collateral value the entrepreneur provides is, the lower credit risk to the bank is and the smaller risk of adverse selection is.
%K information asymmetry
%K opportunity benefit
%K adverse selection
%K defaulting probability<br>信息不对称
%K 机会利益
%K 逆向选择
%K 拖欠概率
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=0EFC64D5E2EF2F6E&yid=D43C4A19B2EE3C0A&vid=EA389574707BDED3&iid=0B39A22176CE99FB&sid=6209D9E8050195F5&eid=7C3A4C1EE6A45749&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=4&reference_num=6