%0 Journal Article
%T N-M STABLE SET OF A REGULAR GAME AND ITS UNIQUE EXISTENCE THEOREM<br>正则对策的N-M稳定集及其唯一存在定理
%A JIANG Dianyu
%A <br>姜殿玉
%J 系统科学与数学
%D 2010
%I 
%X This paper is concerned with infinite strategic games with asymmetric and negatively transitive preferences. An N-M stable set in a strategic game is introduced by the analogous way given by von Neumann and Morgenstern in cooperative games. An infinite strategic game is regular if every chain in the set of Nash equilibria with respect to the uniform preference is upper bounded. It is shown that every regular game has a unique N-M stable set. The result and its applied example show that the concept of N-M stable set in regular games plays an important role to refine pure Nash equilibria.
%K Regular game
%K N-M stable set
%K vagabonds' game
%K preference
%K Zorn's lemma<br>正则对策
%K N-M
%K 稳定集
%K 流浪汉对策
%K 偏好
%K Zorn引理.
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=6E709DC38FA1D09A4B578DD0906875B5B44D4D294832BB8E&cid=37F46C35E03B4B86&jid=0CD45CC5E994895A7F41A783D4235EC2&aid=99444B21FABD9DB54250660311FCFDCF&yid=140ECF96957D60B2&vid=340AC2BF8E7AB4FD&iid=DF92D298D3FF1E6E&sid=808D6B9EB5A8B4B4&eid=CFC2B32D03D9F610&journal_id=1000-0577&journal_name=系统科学与数学&referenced_num=0&reference_num=19